The idea that a listener should pay for what they actually play is not a new one. It predates streaming entirely. And yet every serious attempt to build a music economy around it has either collapsed, stayed small, or quietly retreated into a modified version of the flat-fee model it set out to replace. That pattern is worth examining closely, because what each attempt revealed is not simply that the model is hard to execute. It is that the model asks something specific of listeners - and listeners have a consistent, well-documented set of behaviours that determine what they will and will not accept.

Understanding those behaviours is the only way to understand why this history looks the way it does.

Apple: 99¢ era

When Apple launched the iTunes Store in April 2003, it demonstrated something that the industry had assumed was impossible: consumers would pay per track, at scale, if the process was simple enough. Within a year, iTunes had sold 50 million downloads. By February 2013, Apple reported more than 25 billion songs sold (Apple Inc., 2013). At its peak around 2012, US digital track revenues reached approximately $3.02 billion (Ingham, 2017).

The model worked because it removed almost all friction. You heard a song, you clicked, you paid 99 cents, it was yours. There was no subscription to set up, no ongoing commitment, no thinking about whether you would listen enough to justify a monthly fee. The transaction was proportionate to the behaviour: you wanted one song, you paid for one song.

But the iTunes model also exposed the ceiling of what per-item purchasing could achieve. It required a decision at the moment of listening. You had to want something specifically, consciously enough to buy it. Passive listening, background music, radio-style discovery - none of these behaviours map onto a deliberate purchase. And once Spotify demonstrated that unlimited access could be priced comparably to a handful of downloads, the calculation changed. US digital track revenues fell roughly 12.9% in early 2014 (Dredge, 2014), even as streaming plays nearly doubled year-on-year in the UK over the same period. By 2016, US subscription streaming revenue had reached $3.93 billion, exceeding the all-time peak of digital downloads (Ingham, 2017).

What iTunes taught the industry is that listeners will pay per item when the interface is frictionless and the value is immediate - but that they will abandon that model the moment a cheaper, simpler alternative exists that removes the decision entirely. The psychological cost of choosing to buy something is real. The appeal of unlimited access is, in part, the elimination of that cost.

Napster: Credit experiment

In 2011 Rhapsody, the US subscription streaming service, acquired the Napster brand. The relaunched Napster offered a credit-based listening model alongside standard streaming: subscribers could earn a small number of DRM-free permanent downloads per year as part of their annual plan, effectively treating some streams as leading toward ownership. One reported plan offered approximately 60 downloads per year bundled with unlimited streaming for an annual fee of around $60 (Rhapsody International, 2015).

The intent was to give listeners a sense of ownership within a subscription context - to combine the psychological satisfaction of having a track with the convenience of unlimited access. In practice, it did not work. Rhapsody and Napster together held only approximately 1.7 million US subscribers in 2014, growing to around 2.5 million globally by early 2015 (Rhapsody International, 2015). By 2016 Napster had quietly abandoned the credit features and reverted to a standard subscription model.

The failure is instructive. The credits added a layer of complexity without adding sufficient value to justify it. Listeners had to track how many credits they had accrued, understand what they could do with them, and decide which tracks were worth spending a credit on. This reintroduced exactly the kind of decision-making friction that the unlimited subscription had eliminated. The model asked listeners to think about their listening in a way that subscription streaming had trained them not to. From a competitive standpoint, Napster was asking users to engage with a more complex payment model while offering a smaller catalogue than Spotify or Apple. The lesson: adding a per-item mechanic on top of a subscription does not inherit the simplicity of either model. It inherits the cognitive burden of both.

Resonate: Stream-to-own

Founded in Ireland in 2015 and established as a cooperative in 2016, Resonate attempted something structurally different. Its stream2own model charged listeners a price that doubled with each successive play of the same track, starting at approximately 0.002 credits for a first listen and reaching 1.022 credits on the ninth play - at which point the listener had paid the equivalent of a full download price and owned the track permanently (Resonate, 2022). The average pay-per-play across all listens worked out at roughly 0.0096 euros, more than double the streaming market average at the time (Resonate, 2020).

The model was ethically coherent and economically interesting. It incentivised discovery by making first listens cheap, rewarded genuine fans by letting repeated listening convert into ownership, and paid artists at a rate significantly above the market average. As of its last reported figures, Resonate had attracted around 2,600 artists and 340 labels (Resonate, 2022).

That figure tells the story. Despite a genuinely novel model and consistent press interest, Resonate never achieved meaningful consumer scale. The stream2own mechanic, however logical, requires listeners to hold a mental model of their listening behaviour that most people simply do not maintain. How many times have you played this track? How much have you paid so far? How close are you to owning it? These are not questions that listeners naturally ask. The subscription model succeeded in part because it made those questions irrelevant. Resonate's model made them central.

There is also a structural problem. Resonate's cooperative governance model, while philosophically aligned with its values, made it dependent on grants and crowdfunding to fund development (Resonate, 2022). Without the capital to build the catalogue depth and product quality that mainstream listeners expect, the platform could not attract the mainstream listeners it needed to demonstrate the model at scale. It remains a functioning platform with a committed community, but it has not grown beyond that.

Bandcamp: Direct purchase model

Bandcamp never positioned itself as a streaming service. It is, and has always been, a direct-to-fan marketplace where artists set their own prices and listeners pay to download music, with Bandcamp taking a 15% commission that drops to 10% after an artist surpasses $5,000 in sales (Bandcamp, 2023). There are no subscription fees, no royalty pools, and no per-stream rates. When a fan buys an album on Bandcamp, the artist receives approximately 85% of the sale price.

By the measures that matter for artists, Bandcamp works. It is the most commercially successful non-pooled model in the western music market. It has supported a sustained ecosystem of independent artists and labels for well over a decade. Bandcamp Friday, launched in 2020, on which Bandcamp waives its revenue share entirely, became a significant cultural moment - fans actively planning their purchases to maximise the money reaching artists directly.

But Bandcamp also illustrates the limits of the purchase model at scale. Its audience is, by definition, people who have made a deliberate choice to seek out and financially support music they care about. This is a valuable and committed audience. It is not a mainstream one. The friction of the purchase decision - the same friction that ultimately limited iTunes - is if anything higher on Bandcamp, because the platform explicitly frames buying as an act of support rather than consumption. That framing is powerful for the audience it attracts. It does not scale to casual listeners.

Bandcamp's recent ownership history is also relevant. Acquired by Epic Games in March 2022, it was sold to Songtradr in September 2023 following Epic's decision to cut 16% of its workforce (Songtradr, 2023). Roughly half of Bandcamp's staff were not offered roles in the transition. The editorial platform Bandcamp Daily, which had been a significant part of the site's cultural identity, was effectively gutted. The platform continues to operate but its future trajectory under a B2B licensing company with very different commercial priorities is uncertain. Even the most artist-aligned model in the market has proven vulnerable to the economics of platform ownership.

Deezer: Artist-centric experiment

In September 2023, Deezer and Universal Music Group announced the Artist-Centric Payment System, first rolled out in France later that year and extended to publishing rights via a partnership with Sacem in January 2025 (Universal Music Group, 2023; Music Business Worldwide, 2025). By early 2026, Deezer reported that 85% of its label partners had adopted the model (Lanternier, 2026).

The ACPS does not eliminate the pool. Streams still aggregate and are divided by share. What it changes is the weighting applied to different types of streams. Artists who can demonstrate an active fanbase, defined as at least 1,000 streams from at least 500 unique listeners in a given month, receive a doubled weighting on those streams (Universal Music Group, 2023). Streams categorised as non-artist noise, including functional audio and suspected artificial streams, are excluded from the pool entirely.

Deezer's own modelling suggests the system redistributes slightly in favour of mid-tier and independent artists with engaged fanbases, at the expense of the very largest acts and long-tail content (Universal Music Group, 2023). No independent audit data has been published.

From a listener's perspective, the ACPS is invisible. Users interact with Deezer exactly as before. The change is entirely in the back-end allocation. This is both its strength and its limitation: it asks nothing of listeners behaviourally, which means it faces no adoption friction. But it also means it cannot claim to have aligned listener behaviour with artist payment, because listener behaviour has not changed at all. What has changed is an algorithm.

SoundCloud: Fan-powered royalties

In April 2021, SoundCloud launched fan-powered royalties for artists on its monetisation tier, making it the first major platform to implement a true user-centric payment model in a live service (Rogerson, 2021). Under the system, each listener's subscription or advertising revenue is allocated only among the artists that listener actually plays, in proportion to their listening time. If a subscriber spends their entire month listening to one artist, that artist receives the full value of that subscriber's contribution to the pool. Nothing is redistributed to artists the listener has never played (SoundCloud, 2021).

All creators on SoundCloud's Premier and Pro tiers, approximately 100,000 artists at launch, were automatically switched to the new model. SoundCloud suggested that some independent artists could see payouts up to 25% higher under the system (Rogerson, 2021). Academic modelling of user-centric approaches broadly supports the finding that mid-tier artists with dedicated fanbases benefit, while the very top acts and the long tail see relatively little change (Alaei et al., 2022).

SoundCloud's model is the closest currently operating approximation to what pay-per-play advocates have argued for. The listener's money goes to the artists the listener chooses. The connection between listening behaviour and artist payment is direct. And unlike Resonate's stream2own model, it requires nothing additional from the listener. The UX is identical to any other streaming service.

The limitation is scale. SoundCloud is primarily a creator and upload platform, not a mainstream consumer streaming service in the way that its larger competitors are. Its catalogue and product experience are optimised for a different audience. The fan-powered royalty model has not yet induced any of the dominant global streaming platforms to follow suit, partly because the incumbents argue that user-centric allocation fragments their pools in ways that disadvantage their most commercially valuable rightsholders, and partly because those platforms have significant incentives to maintain a status quo in which the largest catalogues receive the largest payments.

What this history documents

Read together, these attempts reveal a consistent set of tensions that any non-pooled or per-play model has to resolve.

Listeners have shown, repeatedly and across different markets and decades, that they will accept per-item payment when the transaction is frictionless and the value is immediate (iTunes), but will abandon it when a simpler alternative exists. They resist complexity (Napster's credits, Resonate's doubling price curve) even when the underlying economics are fairer. They respond to acts of deliberate support (Bandcamp Friday) but do not sustain that behaviour at mainstream scale. And they are, in the research literature, strongly subject to status quo bias: switching costs, whether real or perceived, significantly reduce willingness to change payment model even when users express dissatisfaction with the current one (Li and Cheng, 2014, cited in PMC, 2023).

For artists, the recurring frustration is different but equally consistent. Every model that has offered fairer per-stream rates has done so at the cost of catalogue depth, platform reach, or mainstream visibility. Resonate pays better but has 2,600 artists. Bandcamp retains more revenue per sale but serves a self-selecting audience. SoundCloud's fan-powered system operates at a fraction of the scale of its competitors.

The structural and technical conditions that made earlier attempts difficult have shifted considerably. Processing costs for micro-transactions have fallen. Real-time stream tracking is standard infrastructure. The policy environment in the UK and EU is actively interrogating whether the current model serves artists adequately. And the academic and industry conversation around user-centric payment models is more substantive now than at any point since streaming became the dominant format.

What has not yet been demonstrated, at mainstream scale, is a model that is simultaneously as simple as a subscription, as fair as a direct purchase, and large enough to matter to the majority of working artists.

Published by Nomelody.

References

Alaei, A., Jalaly, P. and Tardos, E. (2022) 'A reduction from user-centric to pro-rata royalty models', Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/a02a7554-a6de-4aca-be02-d0f86cd9f7de-MECA.pdf (Accessed: May 2026).

Apple Inc. (2013) iTunes Store sets new record with 25 billion songs sold, Apple Newsroom, 6 February. Available at: https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2013/02/06iTunes-Store-Sets-New-Record-with-25-Billion-Songs-Sold/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Bandcamp (2023) Songtradr acquires Bandcamp, Bandcamp Updates, 22 November. Available at: https://blog.bandcamp.com/2023/11/22/songtradr-acquires-bandcamp/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Dredge, S. (2014) 'Apple iTunes music sales down, so what next for Beats Music?', The Guardian, 27 October. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/apple-itunes-music-sales-beats (Accessed: May 2026).

European Parliament (2024) EU MPs call for fairer streaming and protection of music authors, Press Release, 12 January. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/2024/1/press_release/20240112IPR16773/20240112IPR16773_en.pdf (Accessed: May 2026).

Ingham, T. (2017) 'Streaming is making more money than music downloads ever did', Music Business Worldwide, 5 April. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/streaming-is-making-more-money-than-music-downloads-ever-did/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Lanternier, A. (2026) Deezer achieves profitability in FY25 as strategy delivers tangible results, Deezer Newsroom, 18 March. Available at: https://newsroom-deezer.com/2026/03/deezer-achieves-profitability-in-fy25-as-strategy-delivers-tangible-results/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Li, H. and Cheng, S. (2014) 'Why do users switch from a free service to a paid service? A case of music streaming', cited in PMC (2023) The Behavioural Economics of Music: Systematic review and future directions. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10119905/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Music Business Worldwide (2025) Deezer partners with Sacem to adopt artist-centric payment model for publishing rights in France. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/deezer-partners-with-sacem-to-adopt-artist-centric-payment-model-for-publishing-rights-in-france/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Resonate (2020) Written evidence submitted by Resonate Co-operative, UK Parliament Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/15377/pdf/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Resonate (2022) Resonate Co-op, Open Collective. Available at: https://opencollective.com/resonate (Accessed: May 2026).

Rhapsody International (2015) Rhapsody and Napster surpass 2.5M global subscribers, PR Newswire, 10 February. Available at: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rhapsody--napster-surpass-25m-global-subscribers-300034339.html (Accessed: May 2026).

Rogerson, B. (2021) 'SoundCloud introduces fan-powered royalties, promising a fairer and more lucrative payment model for independent artists', MusicRadar, 3 March. Available at: https://www.musicradar.com/news/soundcloud-introduces-fan-powered-royalties-promising-a-fairer-and-more-lucrative-payment-model-for-independent-artists (Accessed: May 2026).

Songtradr (2023) Songtradr acquires Bandcamp from Epic Games, Music Business Worldwide, 28 September. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/songtradr-acquires-bandcamp-from-fortnite-maker-epic-games1/ (Accessed: May 2026).

SoundCloud (2021) Fan-powered royalties, SoundCloud Help Center. Available at: https://help.soundcloud.com/hc/en-us/articles/1260801306810-Fan-powered-Royalties (Accessed: May 2026).

UK Intellectual Property Office (2024) Industry transparency code on music streaming, Press Release, 31 January. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/industry-transparency-code-on-music-streaming-announced-by-government (Accessed: May 2026).

Universal Music Group (2023) Universal Music Group and Deezer to launch the first comprehensive artist-centric streaming model, News Release, 6 September. Available at: https://www.universalmusic.com/universal-music-group-and-deezer-to-launch-the-first-comprehensive-artist-centric-music-streaming-model/ (Accessed: May 2026).

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We write about the economics of music, how the industry works, and what is changing. No promotion, no agenda.

The idea that a listener should pay for what they actually play is not a new one. It predates streaming entirely. And yet every serious attempt to build a music economy around it has either collapsed, stayed small, or quietly retreated into a modified version of the flat-fee model it set out to replace. That pattern is worth examining closely, because what each attempt revealed is not simply that the model is hard to execute. It is that the model asks something specific of listeners - and listeners have a consistent, well-documented set of behaviours that determine what they will and will not accept.

Understanding those behaviours is the only way to understand why this history looks the way it does.

Apple: 99¢ era

When Apple launched the iTunes Store in April 2003, it demonstrated something that the industry had assumed was impossible: consumers would pay per track, at scale, if the process was simple enough. Within a year, iTunes had sold 50 million downloads. By February 2013, Apple reported more than 25 billion songs sold (Apple Inc., 2013). At its peak around 2012, US digital track revenues reached approximately $3.02 billion (Ingham, 2017).

The model worked because it removed almost all friction. You heard a song, you clicked, you paid 99 cents, it was yours. There was no subscription to set up, no ongoing commitment, no thinking about whether you would listen enough to justify a monthly fee. The transaction was proportionate to the behaviour: you wanted one song, you paid for one song.

But the iTunes model also exposed the ceiling of what per-item purchasing could achieve. It required a decision at the moment of listening. You had to want something specifically, consciously enough to buy it. Passive listening, background music, radio-style discovery - none of these behaviours map onto a deliberate purchase. And once Spotify demonstrated that unlimited access could be priced comparably to a handful of downloads, the calculation changed. US digital track revenues fell roughly 12.9% in early 2014 (Dredge, 2014), even as streaming plays nearly doubled year-on-year in the UK over the same period. By 2016, US subscription streaming revenue had reached $3.93 billion, exceeding the all-time peak of digital downloads (Ingham, 2017).

What iTunes taught the industry is that listeners will pay per item when the interface is frictionless and the value is immediate - but that they will abandon that model the moment a cheaper, simpler alternative exists that removes the decision entirely. The psychological cost of choosing to buy something is real. The appeal of unlimited access is, in part, the elimination of that cost.

Napster: Credit experiment

In 2011 Rhapsody, the US subscription streaming service, acquired the Napster brand. The relaunched Napster offered a credit-based listening model alongside standard streaming: subscribers could earn a small number of DRM-free permanent downloads per year as part of their annual plan, effectively treating some streams as leading toward ownership. One reported plan offered approximately 60 downloads per year bundled with unlimited streaming for an annual fee of around $60 (Rhapsody International, 2015).

The intent was to give listeners a sense of ownership within a subscription context - to combine the psychological satisfaction of having a track with the convenience of unlimited access. In practice, it did not work. Rhapsody and Napster together held only approximately 1.7 million US subscribers in 2014, growing to around 2.5 million globally by early 2015 (Rhapsody International, 2015). By 2016 Napster had quietly abandoned the credit features and reverted to a standard subscription model.

The failure is instructive. The credits added a layer of complexity without adding sufficient value to justify it. Listeners had to track how many credits they had accrued, understand what they could do with them, and decide which tracks were worth spending a credit on. This reintroduced exactly the kind of decision-making friction that the unlimited subscription had eliminated. The model asked listeners to think about their listening in a way that subscription streaming had trained them not to. From a competitive standpoint, Napster was asking users to engage with a more complex payment model while offering a smaller catalogue than Spotify or Apple. The lesson: adding a per-item mechanic on top of a subscription does not inherit the simplicity of either model. It inherits the cognitive burden of both.

Resonate: Stream-to-own

Founded in Ireland in 2015 and established as a cooperative in 2016, Resonate attempted something structurally different. Its stream2own model charged listeners a price that doubled with each successive play of the same track, starting at approximately 0.002 credits for a first listen and reaching 1.022 credits on the ninth play - at which point the listener had paid the equivalent of a full download price and owned the track permanently (Resonate, 2022). The average pay-per-play across all listens worked out at roughly 0.0096 euros, more than double the streaming market average at the time (Resonate, 2020).

The model was ethically coherent and economically interesting. It incentivised discovery by making first listens cheap, rewarded genuine fans by letting repeated listening convert into ownership, and paid artists at a rate significantly above the market average. As of its last reported figures, Resonate had attracted around 2,600 artists and 340 labels (Resonate, 2022).

That figure tells the story. Despite a genuinely novel model and consistent press interest, Resonate never achieved meaningful consumer scale. The stream2own mechanic, however logical, requires listeners to hold a mental model of their listening behaviour that most people simply do not maintain. How many times have you played this track? How much have you paid so far? How close are you to owning it? These are not questions that listeners naturally ask. The subscription model succeeded in part because it made those questions irrelevant. Resonate's model made them central.

There is also a structural problem. Resonate's cooperative governance model, while philosophically aligned with its values, made it dependent on grants and crowdfunding to fund development (Resonate, 2022). Without the capital to build the catalogue depth and product quality that mainstream listeners expect, the platform could not attract the mainstream listeners it needed to demonstrate the model at scale. It remains a functioning platform with a committed community, but it has not grown beyond that.

Bandcamp: Direct purchase model

Bandcamp never positioned itself as a streaming service. It is, and has always been, a direct-to-fan marketplace where artists set their own prices and listeners pay to download music, with Bandcamp taking a 15% commission that drops to 10% after an artist surpasses $5,000 in sales (Bandcamp, 2023). There are no subscription fees, no royalty pools, and no per-stream rates. When a fan buys an album on Bandcamp, the artist receives approximately 85% of the sale price.

By the measures that matter for artists, Bandcamp works. It is the most commercially successful non-pooled model in the western music market. It has supported a sustained ecosystem of independent artists and labels for well over a decade. Bandcamp Friday, launched in 2020, on which Bandcamp waives its revenue share entirely, became a significant cultural moment - fans actively planning their purchases to maximise the money reaching artists directly.

But Bandcamp also illustrates the limits of the purchase model at scale. Its audience is, by definition, people who have made a deliberate choice to seek out and financially support music they care about. This is a valuable and committed audience. It is not a mainstream one. The friction of the purchase decision - the same friction that ultimately limited iTunes - is if anything higher on Bandcamp, because the platform explicitly frames buying as an act of support rather than consumption. That framing is powerful for the audience it attracts. It does not scale to casual listeners.

Bandcamp's recent ownership history is also relevant. Acquired by Epic Games in March 2022, it was sold to Songtradr in September 2023 following Epic's decision to cut 16% of its workforce (Songtradr, 2023). Roughly half of Bandcamp's staff were not offered roles in the transition. The editorial platform Bandcamp Daily, which had been a significant part of the site's cultural identity, was effectively gutted. The platform continues to operate but its future trajectory under a B2B licensing company with very different commercial priorities is uncertain. Even the most artist-aligned model in the market has proven vulnerable to the economics of platform ownership.

Deezer: Artist-centric experiment

In September 2023, Deezer and Universal Music Group announced the Artist-Centric Payment System, first rolled out in France later that year and extended to publishing rights via a partnership with Sacem in January 2025 (Universal Music Group, 2023; Music Business Worldwide, 2025). By early 2026, Deezer reported that 85% of its label partners had adopted the model (Lanternier, 2026).

The ACPS does not eliminate the pool. Streams still aggregate and are divided by share. What it changes is the weighting applied to different types of streams. Artists who can demonstrate an active fanbase, defined as at least 1,000 streams from at least 500 unique listeners in a given month, receive a doubled weighting on those streams (Universal Music Group, 2023). Streams categorised as non-artist noise, including functional audio and suspected artificial streams, are excluded from the pool entirely.

Deezer's own modelling suggests the system redistributes slightly in favour of mid-tier and independent artists with engaged fanbases, at the expense of the very largest acts and long-tail content (Universal Music Group, 2023). No independent audit data has been published.

From a listener's perspective, the ACPS is invisible. Users interact with Deezer exactly as before. The change is entirely in the back-end allocation. This is both its strength and its limitation: it asks nothing of listeners behaviourally, which means it faces no adoption friction. But it also means it cannot claim to have aligned listener behaviour with artist payment, because listener behaviour has not changed at all. What has changed is an algorithm.

SoundCloud: Fan-powered royalties

In April 2021, SoundCloud launched fan-powered royalties for artists on its monetisation tier, making it the first major platform to implement a true user-centric payment model in a live service (Rogerson, 2021). Under the system, each listener's subscription or advertising revenue is allocated only among the artists that listener actually plays, in proportion to their listening time. If a subscriber spends their entire month listening to one artist, that artist receives the full value of that subscriber's contribution to the pool. Nothing is redistributed to artists the listener has never played (SoundCloud, 2021).

All creators on SoundCloud's Premier and Pro tiers, approximately 100,000 artists at launch, were automatically switched to the new model. SoundCloud suggested that some independent artists could see payouts up to 25% higher under the system (Rogerson, 2021). Academic modelling of user-centric approaches broadly supports the finding that mid-tier artists with dedicated fanbases benefit, while the very top acts and the long tail see relatively little change (Alaei et al., 2022).

SoundCloud's model is the closest currently operating approximation to what pay-per-play advocates have argued for. The listener's money goes to the artists the listener chooses. The connection between listening behaviour and artist payment is direct. And unlike Resonate's stream2own model, it requires nothing additional from the listener. The UX is identical to any other streaming service.

The limitation is scale. SoundCloud is primarily a creator and upload platform, not a mainstream consumer streaming service in the way that its larger competitors are. Its catalogue and product experience are optimised for a different audience. The fan-powered royalty model has not yet induced any of the dominant global streaming platforms to follow suit, partly because the incumbents argue that user-centric allocation fragments their pools in ways that disadvantage their most commercially valuable rightsholders, and partly because those platforms have significant incentives to maintain a status quo in which the largest catalogues receive the largest payments.

What this history documents

Read together, these attempts reveal a consistent set of tensions that any non-pooled or per-play model has to resolve.

Listeners have shown, repeatedly and across different markets and decades, that they will accept per-item payment when the transaction is frictionless and the value is immediate (iTunes), but will abandon it when a simpler alternative exists. They resist complexity (Napster's credits, Resonate's doubling price curve) even when the underlying economics are fairer. They respond to acts of deliberate support (Bandcamp Friday) but do not sustain that behaviour at mainstream scale. And they are, in the research literature, strongly subject to status quo bias: switching costs, whether real or perceived, significantly reduce willingness to change payment model even when users express dissatisfaction with the current one (Li and Cheng, 2014, cited in PMC, 2023).

For artists, the recurring frustration is different but equally consistent. Every model that has offered fairer per-stream rates has done so at the cost of catalogue depth, platform reach, or mainstream visibility. Resonate pays better but has 2,600 artists. Bandcamp retains more revenue per sale but serves a self-selecting audience. SoundCloud's fan-powered system operates at a fraction of the scale of its competitors.

The structural and technical conditions that made earlier attempts difficult have shifted considerably. Processing costs for micro-transactions have fallen. Real-time stream tracking is standard infrastructure. The policy environment in the UK and EU is actively interrogating whether the current model serves artists adequately. And the academic and industry conversation around user-centric payment models is more substantive now than at any point since streaming became the dominant format.

What has not yet been demonstrated, at mainstream scale, is a model that is simultaneously as simple as a subscription, as fair as a direct purchase, and large enough to matter to the majority of working artists.

Published by Nomelody.

References

Alaei, A., Jalaly, P. and Tardos, E. (2022) 'A reduction from user-centric to pro-rata royalty models', Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/a02a7554-a6de-4aca-be02-d0f86cd9f7de-MECA.pdf (Accessed: May 2026).

Apple Inc. (2013) iTunes Store sets new record with 25 billion songs sold, Apple Newsroom, 6 February. Available at: https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2013/02/06iTunes-Store-Sets-New-Record-with-25-Billion-Songs-Sold/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Bandcamp (2023) Songtradr acquires Bandcamp, Bandcamp Updates, 22 November. Available at: https://blog.bandcamp.com/2023/11/22/songtradr-acquires-bandcamp/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Dredge, S. (2014) 'Apple iTunes music sales down, so what next for Beats Music?', The Guardian, 27 October. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/apple-itunes-music-sales-beats (Accessed: May 2026).

European Parliament (2024) EU MPs call for fairer streaming and protection of music authors, Press Release, 12 January. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/2024/1/press_release/20240112IPR16773/20240112IPR16773_en.pdf (Accessed: May 2026).

Ingham, T. (2017) 'Streaming is making more money than music downloads ever did', Music Business Worldwide, 5 April. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/streaming-is-making-more-money-than-music-downloads-ever-did/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Lanternier, A. (2026) Deezer achieves profitability in FY25 as strategy delivers tangible results, Deezer Newsroom, 18 March. Available at: https://newsroom-deezer.com/2026/03/deezer-achieves-profitability-in-fy25-as-strategy-delivers-tangible-results/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Li, H. and Cheng, S. (2014) 'Why do users switch from a free service to a paid service? A case of music streaming', cited in PMC (2023) The Behavioural Economics of Music: Systematic review and future directions. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10119905/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Music Business Worldwide (2025) Deezer partners with Sacem to adopt artist-centric payment model for publishing rights in France. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/deezer-partners-with-sacem-to-adopt-artist-centric-payment-model-for-publishing-rights-in-france/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Resonate (2020) Written evidence submitted by Resonate Co-operative, UK Parliament Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/15377/pdf/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Resonate (2022) Resonate Co-op, Open Collective. Available at: https://opencollective.com/resonate (Accessed: May 2026).

Rhapsody International (2015) Rhapsody and Napster surpass 2.5M global subscribers, PR Newswire, 10 February. Available at: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rhapsody--napster-surpass-25m-global-subscribers-300034339.html (Accessed: May 2026).

Rogerson, B. (2021) 'SoundCloud introduces fan-powered royalties, promising a fairer and more lucrative payment model for independent artists', MusicRadar, 3 March. Available at: https://www.musicradar.com/news/soundcloud-introduces-fan-powered-royalties-promising-a-fairer-and-more-lucrative-payment-model-for-independent-artists (Accessed: May 2026).

Songtradr (2023) Songtradr acquires Bandcamp from Epic Games, Music Business Worldwide, 28 September. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/songtradr-acquires-bandcamp-from-fortnite-maker-epic-games1/ (Accessed: May 2026).

SoundCloud (2021) Fan-powered royalties, SoundCloud Help Center. Available at: https://help.soundcloud.com/hc/en-us/articles/1260801306810-Fan-powered-Royalties (Accessed: May 2026).

UK Intellectual Property Office (2024) Industry transparency code on music streaming, Press Release, 31 January. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/industry-transparency-code-on-music-streaming-announced-by-government (Accessed: May 2026).

Universal Music Group (2023) Universal Music Group and Deezer to launch the first comprehensive artist-centric streaming model, News Release, 6 September. Available at: https://www.universalmusic.com/universal-music-group-and-deezer-to-launch-the-first-comprehensive-artist-centric-music-streaming-model/ (Accessed: May 2026).

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The idea that a listener should pay for what they actually play is not a new one. It predates streaming entirely. And yet every serious attempt to build a music economy around it has either collapsed, stayed small, or quietly retreated into a modified version of the flat-fee model it set out to replace. That pattern is worth examining closely, because what each attempt revealed is not simply that the model is hard to execute. It is that the model asks something specific of listeners - and listeners have a consistent, well-documented set of behaviours that determine what they will and will not accept.

Understanding those behaviours is the only way to understand why this history looks the way it does.

Apple: 99¢ era

When Apple launched the iTunes Store in April 2003, it demonstrated something that the industry had assumed was impossible: consumers would pay per track, at scale, if the process was simple enough. Within a year, iTunes had sold 50 million downloads. By February 2013, Apple reported more than 25 billion songs sold (Apple Inc., 2013). At its peak around 2012, US digital track revenues reached approximately $3.02 billion (Ingham, 2017).

The model worked because it removed almost all friction. You heard a song, you clicked, you paid 99 cents, it was yours. There was no subscription to set up, no ongoing commitment, no thinking about whether you would listen enough to justify a monthly fee. The transaction was proportionate to the behaviour: you wanted one song, you paid for one song.

But the iTunes model also exposed the ceiling of what per-item purchasing could achieve. It required a decision at the moment of listening. You had to want something specifically, consciously enough to buy it. Passive listening, background music, radio-style discovery - none of these behaviours map onto a deliberate purchase. And once Spotify demonstrated that unlimited access could be priced comparably to a handful of downloads, the calculation changed. US digital track revenues fell roughly 12.9% in early 2014 (Dredge, 2014), even as streaming plays nearly doubled year-on-year in the UK over the same period. By 2016, US subscription streaming revenue had reached $3.93 billion, exceeding the all-time peak of digital downloads (Ingham, 2017).

What iTunes taught the industry is that listeners will pay per item when the interface is frictionless and the value is immediate - but that they will abandon that model the moment a cheaper, simpler alternative exists that removes the decision entirely. The psychological cost of choosing to buy something is real. The appeal of unlimited access is, in part, the elimination of that cost.

Napster: Credit experiment

In 2011 Rhapsody, the US subscription streaming service, acquired the Napster brand. The relaunched Napster offered a credit-based listening model alongside standard streaming: subscribers could earn a small number of DRM-free permanent downloads per year as part of their annual plan, effectively treating some streams as leading toward ownership. One reported plan offered approximately 60 downloads per year bundled with unlimited streaming for an annual fee of around $60 (Rhapsody International, 2015).

The intent was to give listeners a sense of ownership within a subscription context - to combine the psychological satisfaction of having a track with the convenience of unlimited access. In practice, it did not work. Rhapsody and Napster together held only approximately 1.7 million US subscribers in 2014, growing to around 2.5 million globally by early 2015 (Rhapsody International, 2015). By 2016 Napster had quietly abandoned the credit features and reverted to a standard subscription model.

The failure is instructive. The credits added a layer of complexity without adding sufficient value to justify it. Listeners had to track how many credits they had accrued, understand what they could do with them, and decide which tracks were worth spending a credit on. This reintroduced exactly the kind of decision-making friction that the unlimited subscription had eliminated. The model asked listeners to think about their listening in a way that subscription streaming had trained them not to. From a competitive standpoint, Napster was asking users to engage with a more complex payment model while offering a smaller catalogue than Spotify or Apple. The lesson: adding a per-item mechanic on top of a subscription does not inherit the simplicity of either model. It inherits the cognitive burden of both.

Resonate: Stream-to-own

Founded in Ireland in 2015 and established as a cooperative in 2016, Resonate attempted something structurally different. Its stream2own model charged listeners a price that doubled with each successive play of the same track, starting at approximately 0.002 credits for a first listen and reaching 1.022 credits on the ninth play - at which point the listener had paid the equivalent of a full download price and owned the track permanently (Resonate, 2022). The average pay-per-play across all listens worked out at roughly 0.0096 euros, more than double the streaming market average at the time (Resonate, 2020).

The model was ethically coherent and economically interesting. It incentivised discovery by making first listens cheap, rewarded genuine fans by letting repeated listening convert into ownership, and paid artists at a rate significantly above the market average. As of its last reported figures, Resonate had attracted around 2,600 artists and 340 labels (Resonate, 2022).

That figure tells the story. Despite a genuinely novel model and consistent press interest, Resonate never achieved meaningful consumer scale. The stream2own mechanic, however logical, requires listeners to hold a mental model of their listening behaviour that most people simply do not maintain. How many times have you played this track? How much have you paid so far? How close are you to owning it? These are not questions that listeners naturally ask. The subscription model succeeded in part because it made those questions irrelevant. Resonate's model made them central.

There is also a structural problem. Resonate's cooperative governance model, while philosophically aligned with its values, made it dependent on grants and crowdfunding to fund development (Resonate, 2022). Without the capital to build the catalogue depth and product quality that mainstream listeners expect, the platform could not attract the mainstream listeners it needed to demonstrate the model at scale. It remains a functioning platform with a committed community, but it has not grown beyond that.

Bandcamp: Direct purchase model

Bandcamp never positioned itself as a streaming service. It is, and has always been, a direct-to-fan marketplace where artists set their own prices and listeners pay to download music, with Bandcamp taking a 15% commission that drops to 10% after an artist surpasses $5,000 in sales (Bandcamp, 2023). There are no subscription fees, no royalty pools, and no per-stream rates. When a fan buys an album on Bandcamp, the artist receives approximately 85% of the sale price.

By the measures that matter for artists, Bandcamp works. It is the most commercially successful non-pooled model in the western music market. It has supported a sustained ecosystem of independent artists and labels for well over a decade. Bandcamp Friday, launched in 2020, on which Bandcamp waives its revenue share entirely, became a significant cultural moment - fans actively planning their purchases to maximise the money reaching artists directly.

But Bandcamp also illustrates the limits of the purchase model at scale. Its audience is, by definition, people who have made a deliberate choice to seek out and financially support music they care about. This is a valuable and committed audience. It is not a mainstream one. The friction of the purchase decision - the same friction that ultimately limited iTunes - is if anything higher on Bandcamp, because the platform explicitly frames buying as an act of support rather than consumption. That framing is powerful for the audience it attracts. It does not scale to casual listeners.

Bandcamp's recent ownership history is also relevant. Acquired by Epic Games in March 2022, it was sold to Songtradr in September 2023 following Epic's decision to cut 16% of its workforce (Songtradr, 2023). Roughly half of Bandcamp's staff were not offered roles in the transition. The editorial platform Bandcamp Daily, which had been a significant part of the site's cultural identity, was effectively gutted. The platform continues to operate but its future trajectory under a B2B licensing company with very different commercial priorities is uncertain. Even the most artist-aligned model in the market has proven vulnerable to the economics of platform ownership.

Deezer: Artist-centric experiment

In September 2023, Deezer and Universal Music Group announced the Artist-Centric Payment System, first rolled out in France later that year and extended to publishing rights via a partnership with Sacem in January 2025 (Universal Music Group, 2023; Music Business Worldwide, 2025). By early 2026, Deezer reported that 85% of its label partners had adopted the model (Lanternier, 2026).

The ACPS does not eliminate the pool. Streams still aggregate and are divided by share. What it changes is the weighting applied to different types of streams. Artists who can demonstrate an active fanbase, defined as at least 1,000 streams from at least 500 unique listeners in a given month, receive a doubled weighting on those streams (Universal Music Group, 2023). Streams categorised as non-artist noise, including functional audio and suspected artificial streams, are excluded from the pool entirely.

Deezer's own modelling suggests the system redistributes slightly in favour of mid-tier and independent artists with engaged fanbases, at the expense of the very largest acts and long-tail content (Universal Music Group, 2023). No independent audit data has been published.

From a listener's perspective, the ACPS is invisible. Users interact with Deezer exactly as before. The change is entirely in the back-end allocation. This is both its strength and its limitation: it asks nothing of listeners behaviourally, which means it faces no adoption friction. But it also means it cannot claim to have aligned listener behaviour with artist payment, because listener behaviour has not changed at all. What has changed is an algorithm.

SoundCloud: Fan-powered royalties

In April 2021, SoundCloud launched fan-powered royalties for artists on its monetisation tier, making it the first major platform to implement a true user-centric payment model in a live service (Rogerson, 2021). Under the system, each listener's subscription or advertising revenue is allocated only among the artists that listener actually plays, in proportion to their listening time. If a subscriber spends their entire month listening to one artist, that artist receives the full value of that subscriber's contribution to the pool. Nothing is redistributed to artists the listener has never played (SoundCloud, 2021).

All creators on SoundCloud's Premier and Pro tiers, approximately 100,000 artists at launch, were automatically switched to the new model. SoundCloud suggested that some independent artists could see payouts up to 25% higher under the system (Rogerson, 2021). Academic modelling of user-centric approaches broadly supports the finding that mid-tier artists with dedicated fanbases benefit, while the very top acts and the long tail see relatively little change (Alaei et al., 2022).

SoundCloud's model is the closest currently operating approximation to what pay-per-play advocates have argued for. The listener's money goes to the artists the listener chooses. The connection between listening behaviour and artist payment is direct. And unlike Resonate's stream2own model, it requires nothing additional from the listener. The UX is identical to any other streaming service.

The limitation is scale. SoundCloud is primarily a creator and upload platform, not a mainstream consumer streaming service in the way that its larger competitors are. Its catalogue and product experience are optimised for a different audience. The fan-powered royalty model has not yet induced any of the dominant global streaming platforms to follow suit, partly because the incumbents argue that user-centric allocation fragments their pools in ways that disadvantage their most commercially valuable rightsholders, and partly because those platforms have significant incentives to maintain a status quo in which the largest catalogues receive the largest payments.

What this history documents

Read together, these attempts reveal a consistent set of tensions that any non-pooled or per-play model has to resolve.

Listeners have shown, repeatedly and across different markets and decades, that they will accept per-item payment when the transaction is frictionless and the value is immediate (iTunes), but will abandon it when a simpler alternative exists. They resist complexity (Napster's credits, Resonate's doubling price curve) even when the underlying economics are fairer. They respond to acts of deliberate support (Bandcamp Friday) but do not sustain that behaviour at mainstream scale. And they are, in the research literature, strongly subject to status quo bias: switching costs, whether real or perceived, significantly reduce willingness to change payment model even when users express dissatisfaction with the current one (Li and Cheng, 2014, cited in PMC, 2023).

For artists, the recurring frustration is different but equally consistent. Every model that has offered fairer per-stream rates has done so at the cost of catalogue depth, platform reach, or mainstream visibility. Resonate pays better but has 2,600 artists. Bandcamp retains more revenue per sale but serves a self-selecting audience. SoundCloud's fan-powered system operates at a fraction of the scale of its competitors.

The structural and technical conditions that made earlier attempts difficult have shifted considerably. Processing costs for micro-transactions have fallen. Real-time stream tracking is standard infrastructure. The policy environment in the UK and EU is actively interrogating whether the current model serves artists adequately. And the academic and industry conversation around user-centric payment models is more substantive now than at any point since streaming became the dominant format.

What has not yet been demonstrated, at mainstream scale, is a model that is simultaneously as simple as a subscription, as fair as a direct purchase, and large enough to matter to the majority of working artists.

Published by Nomelody.

References

Alaei, A., Jalaly, P. and Tardos, E. (2022) 'A reduction from user-centric to pro-rata royalty models', Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/a02a7554-a6de-4aca-be02-d0f86cd9f7de-MECA.pdf (Accessed: May 2026).

Apple Inc. (2013) iTunes Store sets new record with 25 billion songs sold, Apple Newsroom, 6 February. Available at: https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2013/02/06iTunes-Store-Sets-New-Record-with-25-Billion-Songs-Sold/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Bandcamp (2023) Songtradr acquires Bandcamp, Bandcamp Updates, 22 November. Available at: https://blog.bandcamp.com/2023/11/22/songtradr-acquires-bandcamp/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Dredge, S. (2014) 'Apple iTunes music sales down, so what next for Beats Music?', The Guardian, 27 October. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/apple-itunes-music-sales-beats (Accessed: May 2026).

European Parliament (2024) EU MPs call for fairer streaming and protection of music authors, Press Release, 12 January. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/2024/1/press_release/20240112IPR16773/20240112IPR16773_en.pdf (Accessed: May 2026).

Ingham, T. (2017) 'Streaming is making more money than music downloads ever did', Music Business Worldwide, 5 April. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/streaming-is-making-more-money-than-music-downloads-ever-did/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Lanternier, A. (2026) Deezer achieves profitability in FY25 as strategy delivers tangible results, Deezer Newsroom, 18 March. Available at: https://newsroom-deezer.com/2026/03/deezer-achieves-profitability-in-fy25-as-strategy-delivers-tangible-results/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Li, H. and Cheng, S. (2014) 'Why do users switch from a free service to a paid service? A case of music streaming', cited in PMC (2023) The Behavioural Economics of Music: Systematic review and future directions. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10119905/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Music Business Worldwide (2025) Deezer partners with Sacem to adopt artist-centric payment model for publishing rights in France. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/deezer-partners-with-sacem-to-adopt-artist-centric-payment-model-for-publishing-rights-in-france/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Resonate (2020) Written evidence submitted by Resonate Co-operative, UK Parliament Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/15377/pdf/ (Accessed: May 2026).

Resonate (2022) Resonate Co-op, Open Collective. Available at: https://opencollective.com/resonate (Accessed: May 2026).

Rhapsody International (2015) Rhapsody and Napster surpass 2.5M global subscribers, PR Newswire, 10 February. Available at: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rhapsody--napster-surpass-25m-global-subscribers-300034339.html (Accessed: May 2026).

Rogerson, B. (2021) 'SoundCloud introduces fan-powered royalties, promising a fairer and more lucrative payment model for independent artists', MusicRadar, 3 March. Available at: https://www.musicradar.com/news/soundcloud-introduces-fan-powered-royalties-promising-a-fairer-and-more-lucrative-payment-model-for-independent-artists (Accessed: May 2026).

Songtradr (2023) Songtradr acquires Bandcamp from Epic Games, Music Business Worldwide, 28 September. Available at: https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/songtradr-acquires-bandcamp-from-fortnite-maker-epic-games1/ (Accessed: May 2026).

SoundCloud (2021) Fan-powered royalties, SoundCloud Help Center. Available at: https://help.soundcloud.com/hc/en-us/articles/1260801306810-Fan-powered-Royalties (Accessed: May 2026).

UK Intellectual Property Office (2024) Industry transparency code on music streaming, Press Release, 31 January. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/industry-transparency-code-on-music-streaming-announced-by-government (Accessed: May 2026).

Universal Music Group (2023) Universal Music Group and Deezer to launch the first comprehensive artist-centric streaming model, News Release, 6 September. Available at: https://www.universalmusic.com/universal-music-group-and-deezer-to-launch-the-first-comprehensive-artist-centric-music-streaming-model/ (Accessed: May 2026).

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We write about the economics of music, how the industry works, and what is changing. No promotion, no agenda.